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WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES
J. Rodney Johnson *
I. INTRODUCTION
The General Assembly of Virginia enacted legislation dealing
with wills, trusts, and estates that added or amended a number of
sections of the Virginia Code in its 2003 Session. In addition,
there were three opinions and one order from the Supreme Court
of Virginia, and one Virginia Circuit Court opinion, that raised is-
sues of interest to the general practitioner as well as the special-
ist in wills, trusts, and estates during the period covered by this
review. This article reports on all of these legislative and judicial
developments.'
II. LEGISLATION
A. Uniform Disclaimer of Property Interests Act (1999)
The 2003 Session replaced Virginia's 1972 enactment of the
Model Disclaimer Act2 with the Uniform Disclaimer of Property
* Professor of Law, Emeritus, University of Richmond School of Law. J.D., 1967, Mar-
shall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary; LL.M., 1970, New York Univer-
sity.
1. In order to facilitate the discussion of numerous Virginia Code sections, they will
often be referred to in the text by their section numbers only. Unless otherwise stated,
those section numbers will refer to the latest printing of the old sections and to the 2003
Supplement for the new sections.
2. Act of Apr. 6, 1972, ch. 449, 1972 Va. Acts 513 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 64.1-188 to -196 (Repl. Vol. 2002)). Although there is no official statutory history
for the original Virginia Disclaimer Act, a comparison of it with the American Bar Associa-
tion ("ABA") Model Act leads one to the conclusion that the ABA Model Act was the obvi-
ous source of the Virginia legislation. See Special Committee of Disclaimer legislation,
Disclaimer of Testamentary and Non-Testamentary Dispositions-Suggestions for a Model
Act, 3 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 131, 137 (1968).
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Interests Act (1999) (the "Uniform Act"),3 which will govern all
disclaimers made after June 30, 2003, even though the property
interest or power being disclaimed came into existence on or be-
fore that date.4 The Uniform Act, which is described by its au-
thors as "the most comprehensive disclaimer statute ever writ-
ten.., is designed to allow every sort of disclaimer."5 From a
functional standpoint, the Uniform Act is intended to operate as
"an enabling statute which prescribes all the rules for refusing a
proffered interest in or power over property and the effect of that
refusal on the power or interest while leaving the effect of the re-
fusal itself to other law." And, in a particularly noteworthy de-
parture from existing American disclaimer law, the Uniform Act
contains no rule requiring a disclaimer to be made within any
given period of time.7 Although a detailed comparison of the Uni-
form Act to prior Virginia law is not feasible within the confines
of this annual review, a listing of the significant Virginia differ-
ences with the Uniform Act is provided in the footnotes.'
3. UNIF. DISCLAIMER OF PROP. INTERESTS ACT (1999) (amended 2002), 8A U.L.A. 51
(Supp. 2003). Copies of the Uniform Act containing the Commissioners' official comments,
which will be indispensable in seeking to completely understand the Uniform Act's opera-
tion, may be obtained from the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, 211 East Ontario Street, Suite 1300, Chicago, IL 60611.
4. Act of Mar. 16, 2003, ch. 253, 2003 Va. Acts - (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 64.1-196.1 to -196.15 (Cum. Supp. 2003)). The effective date provision is found in VA.
CODE ANN. § 64.1-196.15 (Cum. Supp. 2003).
5. UNIF. DISCLAIMER OF PROP. INTERESTS ACT (1999) (amended 2002), 8A U.L.A. 51,
51-52 (Supp. 2003).
6. Id. at 52. However, it should be noted that the 2003 disclaimer legislation did not
repeal Chapter 16 (Virginia Code section 55-278 et. seq.) of Title 55, which deals in great
detail with the right to, manner of, and consequences flowing from, a release of a power of
appointment. The chapter on releases was retained because it was believed that its
greater detail and specificity might be more advantageous in some situations than the
Uniform Act. In order to coordinate the operation of these two somewhat overlapping
chapters, an existing section of the release chapter was amended to provide that "[a] re-
lease made in accordance with [the disclaimer chapter] shall be effective as a disclaimer,"
and a new section was added to provide that "[niothing in [the release chapter] shall oper-
ate as a limitation on the provisions of [the disclaimer chapter]." Act of Mar. 16, 2003, ch.
253, 2003 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 55-286.1 (Repl. Vol. 2003);
codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 55-286.2 (Repl. Vol. 2003)).
7. A disclaimer under the Uniform Act will still have to be made within the time
frame specified in the Internal Revenue Code in order to be recognized as a "qualified dis-
claimer" for federal transfer tax purposes. See 26 U.S.C. § 2518 (2000).
8. (A) There were five Virginia amendments to the Uniform Act, all of which were
proposed by the Virginia Bar Association's Section on Wills, Trusts & Estates. Except as
otherwise noted, the section number references are to the Act as enacted in Virginia, and
not as originally promulgated. These amendments are:
(1) § 64.1-196.1(E). At the end of this subsection, which is the definition of "jointly held
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property," Virginia adds "and includes, without limitation, property held as tenants by the
entirety." VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-196.1(E) (Cum. Supp. 2003).
(2)§ 64.1-196.4(C). This is a new subsection, added to the section dealing with the power to
disclaim, in which Virginia provides that:
[a] custodial parent of a minor for whom no guardian of the property has been
appointed may disclaim, in whole or in part, an interest in or power over
property, including a power of appointment, that (but for the custodial par-
ent's disclaimer) would have passed to the minor as the result of another dis-
claimer. The custodial parent may disclaim the interest or power even if its
creator imposed a spendthrift provision or similar restriction on transfer or a
restriction or limitation on the right to disclaim.
VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-196.4(C) (Cum. Supp. 2003)
(3) § 64.1-196.14. At the beginning of this section, which deals with the permissive rec-
ordation of disclaimers, Virginia inserts a mandatory provision reading '[i]f an instrument
transferring title to real property is disclaimed, a copy of the disclaimer shall be recorded
in the office of the clerk of the circuit court for the jurisdiction where the real property is
located." VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-196.14 (Cum. Supp. 2003). It is doubtful that this addition
has any meaning, notwithstanding its mandatory language, because: (i) a bona fide pur-
chaser from the disclaimant would be protected from the disclaimant's unrecorded dis-
claimer by the recordation system anyway; and (ii) the Uniform Act provides that
"[flailure to file, record, or register the disclaimer does not affect its validity as between
the disclaimant and persons to whom the property interest or power passes by reason of
the disclaimer." Id.; see also UNIF. DISCLAIMER OF PROP. INTERESTS ACT (1999) § 15, 8A
U.L.A. 51, 70 (Supp. 2003).
(4) Virginia omits section 17 of the original 1999 Uniform Act, which provided that "[iun
applying and construing this Uniform Act, consideration must be given to the need to
promote uniformity of the law with respect to its subject matter among States that enact
it." UNIF. DISCLAIMER OF PROP. INTERESTS ACT (1999) § 18 (amended 2002), 8A U.L.A. 51,
71-72 (Supp. 2003). When a 2002 amendment to the Uniform Act added a new section 17,
as noted in (B)(2), below, the original section 17 was renumbered as section 18.
(5) Virginia omits section 18 of the original 1999 Uniform Act, which provided that:
[i]f any provisions of this [Uniform Act] or its application to any person or cir-
cumstances is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provisions or
applications of this [Uniform Act] which can be given effect without the inva-
lid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this [Uniform
Act] are severable.
Id. § 19, 8A U.L.A. at 72 (Supp. 2003). When a 2002 amendment to the Uniform Act added
a new section 17, as noted in (B)(2), below, the original section 18 was renumbered as sec-
tion 19.
(B) The Virginia Act differs from the Uniform Act in two other respects because the two
2002 amendments to the Uniform Act were not included in the Virginia legislation. The
2002 amendments to the Uniform Act were:
(1) A new provision was added stating that "'signed' means, with present intent to au-
thenticate or adopt a record, to; (A) execute or adopt a tangible symbol; or (B) attach to or
logically associate with the record an electronic sound, symbol, or process." Id. § 5(c)(2), 8A
U.L.A. at 57 (Supp. 2003).
(2) A new section was added stating that:
[t]his [Act] modifies, limits, and supercedes the federal Electronic Signatures
in Global and National Commerce Act (15 U.S.C. Section 7001, et. seq.) but
does not modify, limit, or supercede Section 101(c) of that act (15 U.S.C. Sec-
tion 7001(c)) or authorize electronic delivery of any notices described in Sec-
tion 103(b) of that act (15 U.S.C. Section 7003(b)).
Id. § 17, 8A U.L.A. at 71 (Supp. 2003). Note that the insertion of this new section 17
into the Uniform Act in 2002 caused sections 17-20 to be renumbered as sections
2003]
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B. Powers of Attorney and Advance Directives-Access to the
Safe-Deposit Box
It has become a very normal practice for persons who execute
wills in order to avoid the default dispositive provisions of Vir-
ginia succession law upon their death to also execute powers of
attorney and advance directives9 to avoid the default manage-
ment provisions of Virginia's conservatorship'1 and guardian-
ship1' laws upon their incapacity. 2 It is also a normal practice for
persons leasing safe-deposit boxes for the safeguarding of their
valuables to place their wills, powers of attorney, and advance di-
rectives therein. Post-death access problems relating to wills in
safe-deposit boxes, when a decedent is the sole lessee or when no
co-lessee is reasonably available, were addressed in the 1984 Ses-
sion by adding section 6.1-332.1 to provide permissive authority
for a "company or bank" to allow certain persons to make a su-
pervised search of a decedent's box for a will, and to remove "the
will or testamentary instrument for transmission to the appro-
priate clerk." 3
The 2002 Session, faced with corresponding problems dealing
with access to powers of attorney of incapacitated persons in safe-
deposit boxes, amended section 6.1-332.1 in an attempt to provide
a similar permissive-access remedy. 14 However, the 2002 legisla-
tion failed to address advance directives, and its too-literal paral-
18-21.
9. The term "advance directive" may refer to a medical power of attorney, a living
will, or a document incorporating both of the foregoing. See VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2982
(Repl. Vol. 2002).
10. A conservator is "a person appointed by the court who is responsible for managing
the estate and financial affairs of an incapacitated person." Id. § 37.1-134.6 (Cum. Supp.
2003).
11. A guardian is "a person appointed by the court who is responsible for the personal
affairs of an incapacitated person, including responsibility for making decisions regarding
the person's support, care, health, safety, habilitation, education, and therapeutic treat-
ment, and, if not inconsistent with an order of commitment, residence." Id.
12. The statute authorizing the general durable power of attorney is Virginia Code
section 11-9.1. Id. § 11-9.1 (Repl. Vol. 1999). The Health Care Decisions Act, Virginia Code
sections 54.1-2981 through 54.1-2993, governs "advances directives." Id. §§ 54.1-2981 to -
2993 (Repl. Vol. 2002 & Supp. 2003).
13. Act of Apr. 4, 1984, ch. 446, 1984 Va. Acts 716 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§ 6.1-332.1 (Repl. Vol. 1999)).
14. Act of Apr. 1, 2002, ch. 312, 2002 Va. Acts 394 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-
332.1(B) (Cum. Supp. 2002)).
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lelism with the original wills' remedy raised a variety of interpre-
tation issues because wills and powers of attorney are quite dis-
similar instruments that operate in completely different con-
texts."
The 2003 Session appears to have eliminated all of these prob-
lems by recasting section 6.1-332.1 into separate, self-contained
subsections dealing with wills, 6 powers of attorney, 7 and ad-
vance directives, 8 each of which employs subject-specific lan-
guage to reach the desired result-third-party access to safe de-
posit boxes. Thus, upon a physician's certification that a sole
lessee is incapacitated according to the conservatorship test, 9 the
2003 legislation provides that the company or bank may allow
certain persons 20 to search the box for a power of attorney "that
relates to the management of his property or financial affairs,"2'
and may allow any such power to be removed "for transmission to
a person named as agent therein."2 2 Similarly, upon a physician's
certification that a sole lessee is incapacitated according to the
guardianship test,23 the company or bank may allow certain per-
15. For additional discussion of these issues, see J. Rodney Johnson, Annual Survey of
Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 357, 360-62 (2002).
16. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-332.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 2003).
17. Id. § 6.1-332.1(B) (Cum. Supp. 2003).
18. Id. § 6.1-332.1(C) (Cum. Supp. 2003).
19. This test, taken from Virginia Code section 37.1-134.6 (Cum. Supp. 2003), mutatis
mutandis, refers to one who is:
incapable of receiving and evaluating information effectively or responding to
people, events, or environments to such an extent that the individual lacks
the capacity to manage property or financial affairs or provide for his support
or for the support of his legal dependents without the assistance or protection
of another.
Id. § 6.1-332.1(B) (Cum. Supp. 2003).
20. These persons are "the lessee's spouse, next of kin, and persons asserting a knowl-
edge or belief that they are named as an agent in such a power of attorney believed to be
in the box," and their "[a]ccess shall be under the supervision of a designated officer or
employee." Id. § 6.1-332.1(B) (Cum. Supp. 2003).
21. Id.
22. Id. When a box is co-leased, and the co-lessees are not "reasonably available," the
company or bank may also permit access to the "same persons and under the same cir-
cumstances" provided for solely-leased boxes. Id.
23. This test, taken from Virginia Code section 37.1-134.6 (Cum. Supp. 2003), mutatis
mutandis, refers to one who is "incapable of receiving and evaluating information effec-
tively or responding to people, events, or environments to such an extent that the individ-
ual lacks the capacity to meet the essential requirements for his health, care, safety, or
therapeutic need without the assistance or protection of another." Id. § 6.1-332. 1(C) (Cum.
Supp. 2003).
2003]
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sons24 to search the box for' an advance medical directive 25 and
may allow any such directive to be removed "for transmission to a
person named as agent therein."26 Lastly, a final subsection ap-
plicable to wills, powers of attorney, and advance directives con-
tinues the rule insulating the company or bank relying upon this
section's permissive remedy from any liability,27 and adds a new
provision requiring: "The company or bank shall make a photo-
copy of any document removed from a lessee's box pursuant to
this section and place such copy in the box prior to delivering the
original to any person.""
C. Powers of Attorney and Advance Directives-Delivery
A latent problem that was brought to the surface by the 2002
legislation dealing with access to powers of attorney in safe-
deposit boxes, relates to the delivery requirement for powers of
attorney and advance directives.29 It is generally assumed
throughout the law that no legal rights or relations are created
under any document until it is delivered by its author." This rule
24. These persons are "the lessee's guardian, spouse, next of kin, and persons assert-
ing a knowledge or belief that they are named as an agent in an advance medical directive
believed to be in the box," and their "[aiccess shall be under the supervision of a desig-
nated officer or employee." VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-332.1(C) (Cum. Supp. 2003).
25. Id.
26. Id. Because an advance directive that functions solely as a living will may speak
directly to the patient's attending physician instead of naming an agent, the statute fur-
ther provides for delivery of an advance directive "in the absence of such a person (named
as an agent therein), to the lessee's attending physician to be made a part of the lessee's
medical records." Id. When a box is co-leased, and the co-lessees are not "reasonably avail-
able," the company or bank may also permit access to the "same persons and under the
same circumstances" provided for solely-leased boxes. Id.
27. The only exceptions to this immunity are when the bank or company acts in bad
faith or permits other items to be removed from the box. Id. § 6.1-332.1(D) (Cum. Supp.
2003).
28. Id.
29. For addition discussion of this problem, see Johnson, supra note 15, at 362.
30. As stated by the Mississippi Supreme Court:
As between the parties, the principal and the purported attorney-in-fact, all
that is requisite to the enforceability of the power of attorney is execution and
delivery in the same sense that, as between grantor and grantee, all that is
necessary for a deed to be valid and enforceable is that the grantor execute it
and deliver it.
Kountouris v. Varvaris, 476 So. 2d 599, 604 (Miss. 1985). For a discussion of the delivery
issue in the context of powers of attorney, see Andrew H. Hook et al., Durable Powers of
Attorney, Tax Mgmt. (BNA), No. 859, at A-18 (2000).
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presents an obvious problem when dealing with a power of attor-
ney or advance directive that was never delivered by the principal
and is not received by the agent until a time when the principal,
due to incapacity, is legally incapable of making the requisite de-
livery.3' Although the new safe-deposit box legislation will in-
crease the number of cases involving post-capacity receipt of pow-
ers of attorney and advance directives, a significant number of
cases have existed for some time, such as, for example, those
where the co-lessee of a safe-deposit box makes a document avail-
able to the agent following the principal's incapacity, or when a
principal keeps the document at the home or office where it is
discovered following the principal's incapacity and given to the
agent, etc.
In order to prevent the non-delivery issue from creating a prob-
lem with the acceptance of powers of attorney and advance direc-
tives in the ordinary course of business, the 2003 Session added
two new statutes to the Virginia Code. New Virginia Code section
11-9.7 provides that an agent in possession of an otherwise valid
power of attorney "shall... be deemed to possess the powers and
authority granted by such instrument notwithstanding any fail-
ure of the principal to deliver the instrument to him, and persons
dealing with such.., agent shall have no obligation to inquire
into the manner or circumstances by which such possession was
acquired."3 2 And new Virginia Code section 54.1-2989.1 creates a
parallel provision applicable to the delivery of advance medical
directives.33
31. In order to avoid this delivery problem in practice, many attorneys advise their
clients who are unwilling to make an immediate delivery of a power of attorney or advance
directive to the chosen agent to make a delivery instead to a third party, in escrow, with
the escrowee to make physical delivery to the agent upon the occurrence of facts or cir-
cumstances stipulated by the principal.
32. VA. CODE ANN. § 11-9.7 (Cum. Supp. 2003). Although this legislation is designed
to eliminate any delivery question from arising as a power of attorney passes in commerce,
it does not intend to otherwise eliminate this issue as a valid concern. Thus, this legisla-
tion also provides that "nothing herein shall preclude the court from considering such
manner or circumstances [by which possession was acquired] as relevant factors in any
proceeding brought to terminate, suspend or limit the authority of the attorney-in-fact or
other agent." Id.
33. Id. § 54.1-2989.1 (Cum. Supp. 2003).
20031
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D. Boiler-Plate Fiduciary Powers-Power of Sale over Realty-
Definition of "Estate"
Virginia Code section 64.1-57 contains a collection of fiduciary
powers that may be conferred upon an executor or trustee by ref-
erence thereto in the governing will or trust,34 and Virginia Code
section 64.1-57.1 creates a procedure whereby a circuit court may
grant any or all of these powers to a personal representative or
trustee when the governing instrument fails to do so, and to an
administrator where there is no will.3 5 One of these powers au-
thorizes a fiduciary to "sell ... any ... property, either real, per-
sonal or mixed, which may be included in, or may at any time be-
come part of the trust or estate."36 In the context of a Virginia
Code section 64.1-57.1 proceeding brought by an administrator
requesting this power in order to sell real estate in an intestate
decedent's estate, a circuit court held that the word "estate" in
this provision did not include a decedent's real estate passing by
intestate succession. 37 In response to this decision, the 2003 Ses-
sion amended Virginia Code section 64.1-57 to provide that "[fior
the purposes of this section, the term 'estate' shall include all in-
terests in the real or personal property of a decedent passing by
will or by intestacy."3 In addition, the 2003 Session stated that
"[tihis subsection is declarative of existing law."39
34. Id. § 64.1-57 (Supp. 2003).
35. Id. § 64.1-57.1 (Repl. Vol. 2002 & Supp. 2003).
36. Id. § 64.1-57(1)(b) (Supp. 2003).
37. In re Estate of Rountree, No. HQ-2426-4 (Va. Cir. Ct. Apr. 23, 2002) (Richmond
City). This case, in which the Virginia Bar Association appeared as amicus curiae in oppo-
sition on appeal, was reversed by an order of the Supreme Court of Virginia. See In re Bul-
lock, No. 021740 (Va. Apr. 17, 2003); see also infra Parts III.D., VI.
38. Act of Mar. 16, 2003, ch. 30, 2003 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 64.1-57(7) (Cum. Supp. 2003)).
39. Id. Anecdotal evidence indicates that when the General Assembly enacts legisla-
tion as "declarative" or "declaratory" of existing law, it does so to communicate its intent
that the legislation in question is not meant to establish a new rule of law that will be ef-
fective only from the legislation's effective date, which, in the absence of its passage as
emergency legislation, would be July 1 of that legislative year. Such a statement might be
a part of legislation that is intended to codify a common law rule believed to already exist
in the Commonwealth, or as in the present case, to express the General Assembly's intent
regarding the proper interpretation of prior legislation, i.e., what it meant by what was
originally said. However, the term has had a mixed reception in the courts. In Sims
Wholesale Co. v. Brown-Forman Corp., the Court found it unnecessary to "rule on the ef-
fect, if any, of the enactment" in order to correctly decide the case before it. 251 Va. 398,
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E. Revocable Inter Vivos Trust-Conservator's Power to Revoke
In response to a petition filed by the conservator of an incapaci-
tated grantor of a revocable inter vivos trust, the trial court's de-
cision in In re Rudwick4 ° concluded that Virginia statutory law
empowered the conservator to revoke the trust without obtaining
court approval.4' In response to this decision, the 2003 Session of
the General Assembly amended Virginia Code section 37.1-137.5
to provide that "[a] conservator may exercise the incapacitated
person's power to revoke or amend a trust or to withdraw or de-
mand distribution of trust assets only with the approval of the
court for good cause shown, unless the trust instrument expressly
provides otherwise."42 Several of the practical problems presented
by the Rudwick decision would also be a concern if an incapaci-
tated person's power to revoke a revocable trust could be exer-
cised by an agent under a durable power of attorney.43 Thus, it is
407, 468 S.E.2d 905, 910 (1996). In Berner v. Mills, the Court determined, as a matter of
law, that certain amendments "were not intended to be applied retroactively. Thus we
hold that the phrase 'declaratory of existing law' is not a statement of retroactive intent."
265 Va. 408, 414, 579 S.E.2d 159, 161 (2003). When the meaning of the term was before
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, it stated that "[wihile the legis-
lature can only make law and cannot declare what the existing law is, the statement by
the General Assembly clearly evidences an intent for the statute to be applied retroac-
tively." Ridenour v. Commissioner, 36 F.3d 332, 335 (4th Cir. 1994).
40. No. 01633, 2002 WL 31730757, at *3-4 (Va. Cir. Ct. Dec. 5, 2002) (Arlington
County).
41. Id. No final order was entered implementing this decision because the incapaci-
tated person died while the court was reconsidering its decision following a rehearing in
which amicus curiae briefs in opposition thereto were filed and arguments were made by
the Virginia Bar Association and the Virginia Bankers Association. See infra Part IV.
42. Act of Mar. 16, 2003, ch. 528, 2003 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 37.1-137.5(D) (Cum. Supp. 2003)).
43. Two issues of significant concern arise in connection with control and succession.
First, except in those cases where the agent and trustee are the same person, allowing an
agent to revoke the trust will displace the one specifically chosen by the incapacitated per-
son to be in control of the assets in question-without the need to show any cause there-
fore or that such action would be in the incapacitated principal's best interests. This is not
good law or policy. The mere fact that the power of attorney contains language authorizing
the revocation of trusts should make no difference when one takes into account how easy it
is to obtain a power of attorney (which has no witness or notary requirement) from one
who is in a weakened condition, and the fact that powers of attorney, typically seen as the
quintessential "form" document, are seldom read prior to their execution. Second, an in-
creasing number of persons are using the revocable inter vivos trusts as a will-substitute,
including the primary dispositive provisions for their assets at death, and adding their
probate estate thereto by way of a pour-over will. If, in such a case, the trust is revoked by
an agent under a power of attorney, the principal will be rendered intestate and the prin-
cipal's estate will pass to the principal's heirs and distributees under intestate succession
law instead of to the principal's chosen beneficiaries. See VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-73.1(C)
20031
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
submitted that the 2004 Session should enact legislation applica-
ble to agents that parallels the 2003 legislation applicable to con-
servators.
F. Fiduciary Administration-Small Estates-Inflationary
Adjustments
Continuing the inflation-adjustment work begun in 2001," the
2003 Session increased the ceiling applicable to five additional fi-
duciary administration or small estate statutes from $10,000 to
$15,000."5 These five provisions are: (1) the omnibus provision in
Title 8 dealing with the payment of small amounts to certain per-
sons through court without the intervention of a fiduciary, the
somewhat similar authority of commissioners of accounts, and
the exemption of certain fiduciaries from accountings; 6 (2) the
clerk of court's permissive waiver of surety upon the official bond
of a fiduciary qualifying in the clerk's office;47 (3) the surrender of
an incapacitated person's estate to the person upon restoration of
capacity, or to the person's successors in interest upon death;" (4)
the exemption of a decedent's estate from probate tax;49 and (5)
the personal representative's duty to file a probate tax return.50
G. Small Estates-First Account
Virginia Code section 26-17.3 is the general statute requiring
fiduciaries, governed by Chapter 2 of Title 26, to account before
their jurisdiction's commissioner of accounts for all receipts and
disbursements during each accounting period.51 The initial ac-
counting period varies: (1) for a conservator, guardian of a minor's
(Repl. Vol. 2002). Again, this is not good law or policy.
44. For a report on the 2001 adjustments, see J. Rodney Johnson, Annual Survey of
Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 845, 854-56 (2001). For a
report on additional changes in 2002, see Johnson, supra note 15, at 363-64.
45. Act of Mar. 16, 2003, ch. 195, 2003 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 8.01-606 (Cum. Supp. 2003), id. § 26-4 (Cum. Supp. 2003), id. § 37.1-144 (Cum.
Supp. 2003), id. §§ 58.1-1712, -1714 (Cum. Supp. 2003)).
46. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-606 (Cum. Supp. 2003).
47. Id. § 26-4 (Cum. Supp. 2003).
48. Id. § 37.1-144 (Cum. Supp. 2003).
49. Id. § 58.1-1712 (Cum. Supp. 2003).
50. Id. § 58.1-1714 (Cum. Supp. 2003).
51. Id. § 26-17.3 (Repl. Vol. 2001 & Cum. Supp. 2003).
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estate, committee, and trustee under Virginia Code section
37.1-134.20, it is the first four months following qualification;52
(2) for a personal representative, it is the first twelve months fol-
lowing qualification; 3 and (3) for a testamentary trustee required
to account,54 it is the remainder of the calendar year in which the
trust was funded.55 Thereafter, all of these fiduciaries have an ob-
ligation to account annually so long as they remain in office.56
In order to reduce the annual accounting burden on small es-
tates, Virginia Code section 26-20 gives commissioners of ac-
counts the discretion to allow fiduciaries listed in Virginia Code
section 26-17.3 to account on a three-year basis, following their
initial account, if their estates do not exceed $15,000."7 However,
notwithstanding the varying periods established for initial ac-
counts noted above, Virginia Code section 26-20 has inconsis-
tently provided that the initial accounting period for all fiduciar-
ies listed in Virginia Code section 26-17.3 is one year if their
52. Id. § 26-17.4(A) (Repl. Vol. 2001 & Cum. Supp. 2003). The title of this statute also
referred to "receivers under § 55-44," until 2003, although the 1999 Session repealed Vir-
ginia Code section 55-44, which addressed the control of the estate of a married woman
who is a minor, and deleted the reference thereto within the body of Virginia Code section
26-17.4. See Act of Feb. 27, 1999, ch. 16, 1999 Va. Acts 22 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE. ANN. § 26-17.4 (Repl. Vol. 2001)). An editor's note appended to this section in the
2003 Cumulative Supplement states that "[alt the direction of the Virginia Code Commis-
sion 'under § 55-44' has been deleted from the end of the section catchline." However, the
section catchline still refers to "receivers," a category of fiduciary not dealt with by the
statute. VA. CODE ANN. § 26-17.4 (Cum. Supp. 2003).
53. Id. § 26-17.5(A) (Repl. Vol. 2001 & Cum. Supp. 2003).
54. Subject to certain limitations, a testamentary trustee's obligation to account may
be waived by the testator or by the trust's adult beneficiaries. Id. § 26-17.7 (Repl. Vol.
2001 & Cum. Supp .2003).
55. Id. § 26-17.6(A) (Repl. Vol. 2001). There are two exceptions to this rule. A trustee
that is a corporation qualifying under Virginia Code section 6.1-5, and a trustee permitted
by the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") to file income tax returns on a fiscal year basis,
may elect to file their initial account for the period of the trust's first "fiscal year." Id.
§ 26-17.6(C) (Repl. Vol. 2001 & Cum. Supp. 2003).
56. This annual period is expressed: (1) for a conservator, guardian of a minor's es-
tate, committee, and trustee under Virginia Code section 37.1-134.20 as "each succeeding
twelve-month period." Id. § 26-17.4(B) (Repl. Vol. 2001 & Cum. Supp. 2003); (2) for a per-
sonal representative as "each succeeding twelve-month period." Id. § 26-17.5(B) (Repl. Vol.
2001 & Cum. Supp. 2003); and (3) for a testamentary trustee required to account as "each
calendar year thereafter." Id. § 26-17.6(A) (Repl. Vol. 2001 & Cum. Supp. 2003). There are
three categories of such trustees who may elect, instead, each succeeding "fiscal year": (1)
trustees who qualified prior to July 1, 1993 and elected to operate on a fiscal year basis; (2)
trustees who qualify at any time, one of which is a corporation qualified under Virginia
Code section 6.1-5; and (3) trustees permitted by IRS to file income tax returns on a fiscal
year basis. Id. § 26-17.6(B)-(C) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
57. Id. § 26-20 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
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fiduciary estate does not exceed $15,000.58 The 2003 Session
eliminates this inconsistency by amending Virginia Code section
26-20 to provide that the initial accounting period for these small
estates is "the appropriate time period provided in §§ 26-17.4
through 26-17.7.""9
H. Decedents' Estates - Inventory Requirement - Attorneys in
Default
Virginia Code section 26-12 states the basic rule requiring fi-
duciaries to file an estate inventory with the commissioner of ac-
counts within four months of qualifying on an estate.6" The first of
several enforcement provisions contained in Virginia Code section
26-13 requires the commissioner of accounts to issue a summons
to any fiduciary failing to meet this four-month filing deadline,
"requiring him to make such return" and, upon the fiduciary's
failure to remedy this default within thirty days from service of
the summons, to "report the fact to his court."' As the receipt of a
summons does not have the same motivating effect upon an at-
torney as upon a layperson, the 2003 Session further provided
that:
[w]henever the commissioner reports to the court that a fiduciary,
who is an attorney-at-law licensed to practice in the Commonwealth,
has failed to make the required return within 30 days after the date
of service of a summons, the commissioner shall also mail a copy of
his report to the Virginia State Bar.
62
Presumably, the implied threat of an ethics proceeding will have
the desired motivational impact.
58. "If the principal sum held by any fiduciary mentioned in § 26-17.3 does not exceed
$15,000, such fiduciary shall exhibit his accounts before the commissioner within four
months after the expiration of one year from the date of the order conferring his authority
as provided in § 26-17.3 ... ." Id.
59. Act of Mar. 16, 2003, ch. 193, 2003 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 26-20 (Cum. Supp. 2003)).
60. VA. CODE ANN. § 26-12 (Repl. Vol. 2001).
61. Id. § 26-13 (Cum. Supp. 2003).
62. Act of Mar. 16, 2003, ch. 193, 2003 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 26-13 (Cum. Supp. 2003)). The same language is found in the section dealing with
the enforcement of a fiduciary's obligation to account before the commissioner of accounts.
See VA. CODE ANN. § 26-18 (Repl. Vol. 2001).
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I. Spousal Allowances and Augmented Estate -Waiver -
Writing Requirement
The validity of an oral, post-marital property agreement, in an
estates context, was brought before the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia in Flanary v. Milton.63 On the day preceding the husband's
("H") death, and while the wife's ("W") deposition was being taken
in a divorce proceeding between H and W, "an oral agreement be-
tween the parties was recited into the record by the parties' at-
torneys," the provisions of which W agreed would constitute "'a
full and final settlement of all rights accrued by virtue of this
marriage.""'64 When W subsequently petitioned for spousal allow-
ances and an elective share in H's augmented estate, the trial
court ruled that the "oral agreement was valid and effectively re-
leased" these rights.65 This ruling was consistent with the Court
of Appeals of Virginia's decision in Richardson v. Richardson,66
which held that 'compromises and settlement agreements to
pending litigation which incidentally include issues of property
and spousal support' are not within the purview of [Virginia]
Code [section] 20-155 and, thus, do not need to comply with the
requirement that such agreements be in writing."6" However, the
Supreme Court of Virginia "reject[ed] .. . the rationale and hold-
ing of Richardson," and reversed the trial court's decision.6"
In response to Flanary, the 2003 Session amended Virginia
Code section 20-155 to provide that:
[i]f the terms of such [marital] agreement[s] are (i) contained in a
court order endorsed by counsel or the parties or (ii) recorded and
transcribed by a court reporter and affirmed by the parties on the re-
cord personally, the agreement is not required to be in writing and is
considered to be executed.69
Although this legislation was prompted by Flanary, it would not
have changed the result therein, even if it had been applicable
63. 263 Va. 20, 556 S.E.2d 767 (2002). Flanary is discussed in more detail in Johnson,
supra note 15, at 377-78.
64. Flanary, 263 Va. at 21-22, 556 S.E.2d at 768 (2002).
65. Id.
66. 10 Va. App. 391, 392 S.E.2d 688 (Ct. App. 1990).
67. Id. at 398, 392 S.E.2d at 691.
68. Flanary, 263 Va. at 23, 556 S.E.2d at 769.
69. Act of Mar. 19, 2003, ch. 662, 2003 Va. Acts - (codified as amended Va. CODE
ANN. § 20-155 (Cum. Supp. 2003)).
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thereto, because although the agreement appears to have been
recorded and transcribed by a "court reporter,"" it clearly was not
affirmed by H on the record "personally."71
J. Presumption of Death-"Generic" Specific Peril Exception
Virginia Code section 64.1-105, dealing with the presumed
death of a person who has not been heard from for a period of
seven years, requires an unnecessarily long wait in those in-
stances where it is reasonable to assume that one has in fact died
at an earlier time. Thus the General Assembly of Virginia has
passed specific and general exceptions to this seven-year rule to
provide relief in some of these cases,72 and the 2002 Session
added a "9/11 exception" dealing with missing persons who were
"documented to have been in that portion of the Pentagon dam-
aged by the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, or on Ameri-
can Airlines Flight 77 on September 11, 2001, when it was flown
into the Pentagon."73 One problem with the 2002 legislation was
its failure to address the consequences of the other September 11,
2001 terrorist attacks that occurred at the World Trade Center in
New York and aboard United Airlines Flight 93 that crashed in
Pennsylvania. When this deficiency was called to the attention of
the 2003 Session, along with the general undesirability of con-
70. The term "court reporter" is not defined in the Virginia Code, and there has been
some uncertainty about whether or not a staff person in an attorney's office, who is a no-
tary public, fits within the term when taking the deposition of a party in the attorney's
office as a part of a divorce proceeding. However, a recent attorney general's opinion has
concluded that, assuming the notary public administers an oath to the individual giving
the deposition, "an attorney's secretary, who is a notary public, accurately recording, by
stenographic, electronic or other means, the testimony of a party to a divorce proceeding is
a 'court reporter' within the context of [Virginia Code] § 20-155(ii)." Op. to Hon. William J.
Howell, Speaker of the House of Delegates (July 31, 2003), available at http://www.
oag.state.va.us/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2003).
71. H was not present at the taking of W's deposition. His assent to the agreement
was given by his attorney. In response to a question from W's attorney, /'s attorney re-
sponded "[m]y client is agreeable to the agreement as you stated for the record." Appendix
to the Record at 10, Flanary, 263 Va. 20, 556 S.E.2d 767 (2002) (No. 010220).
72. See, for example, Virginia Code section 64.1-105.1 (Repl. Vol. 2002), dealing with
persons disappearing in floods resulting from Hurricane Camille, and Virginia Code sec-
tion 64.1-105.2 (Repl. Vol. 2002), dealing with persons disappearing from a ship or vessel
at sea or on board an aircraft which disappears at sea.
73. Act of Feb. 28, 2002, ch. 58, 2002 Va. Acts 51. This legislation, which was enacted
as "§ 1," was not codified in the Virginia Code. However, its text does appear in an editor's
note appended to Virginia Code section § 64.1-105. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-105 (Repl. Vol.
2002). This legislation is discussed in more detail in Johnson, supra note 15, at 367-68.
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tinuing to address such problems on an after-the-fact ad hoc ba-
sis, it enacted a Virginia Bar Association sponsored "specific
peril" exception to the seven-year rule that will provide a remedy
in cases brought after June 30, 2003, even though the disappear-
ance in question may have occurred prior to that time, without
the need for any further legislation.74 This new "generic" specific-
peril exception to the general rule of Virginia Code section 64.1-
105 provides that "[t]he fact that any person was exposed to a
specific peril of death may be a sufficient basis for determining at
any time after the exposure that the person is presumed to have
died less than seven years after the person was last heard
from."75
K. Wrongful Death or Personal Injury-No Executor for Deceased
Plaintiff
Virginia Code section 64.1-75.1 was amended by the 2001 Ses-
sion to provide that when an action is brought for personal injury
or wrongful death arising out of acts occurring in Virginia against
a deceased resident, as well as a deceased non-resident, "for
whose estate an executor has not been appointed, an administra-
tor of such person may be appointed [in Virginia], solely for the
purpose of prosecution of said suit."76 The 2003 Session extended
this remedy to those cases where the action is being brought "on
behalf of the estate or the beneficiaries of the estate of a [de-
ceased] resident or nonresident" for whose estate no executor has
been appointed.77
74. Act of Mar. 19, 2001 ch. 254, 2003 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 64.1-105(B) (Supp. 2003)).
75. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-105(B) (Supp. 2003). The substantive language of the Vir-
ginia legislation was drawn from the New York provision in N.Y. EST. POWERS & TR. LAW
§ 2-1.7(b) (Consol. 2002), and a similar Pennsylvania provision in 20 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 5701(c) (2002). The 2003 legislation also made several clarifying amendments to Virginia
Code section 64.1-105 and recast it into four subsections. See Act of Mar. 16, 2003, ch. 254,
2003 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-105 (Supp. 2003)).
76. Act of Mar. 19, 2001, ch. 376, 2001 Va. Acts 356 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 64.1-75.1 (Repl. Vol. 2002)). This legislation was the subject of negative comment in
J. Rodney Johnson, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 35 U. RICH.
L. REV. 845, 863-64 (2001).
77. Act of Mar. 16, 2003, ch. 256, 2003 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 64.1-75.1 (Supp. 2003)). The negative comments mentioned in the preceding foot-
note were not addressed by the 2003 legislation.
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L. Wrongful Death-Statutory Beneficiaries
Virginia Code section 8.01-53, which identifies the classes of
statutory beneficiaries in wrongful death cases, was amended by
the 2003 Session to provide that, in the absence of any such bene-
ficiaries, "the award shall be distributed in the course of descents
as provided for in § 64. 1_1. ",7' Although not a part of this legisla-
tion, it is interesting to note that although Virginia Code section
8.01-53 prohibits one whose parental rights have been terminated
from being a beneficiary thereunder, it does not address two other
cases where "undeserving" persons are prohibited from taking
under intestate succession law.v9  Virginia Code section
64.1-5.1(3)(b), dealing with inheritance upon the death of an ille-
gitimate person, prohibits the father and his kindred from inher-
iting "from or through the child unless the father has openly
treated the child as his and has not refused to support the
child;"8 0 and Virginia Code section 64.1-16.3 prohibits abandoning
spouses and parents from taking by intestate succession from
those they have abandoned.81 It would seem that the public policy
represented by these two sections of intestate succession law
should also be made applicable to statutory beneficiaries of a
wrongful death award.
M. Preneed Funeral Contracts-Irrevocable Trusts
The general rule of Virginia Code section 54.1-2820, which
states the requirements for preneed funeral contracts, requires
the inclusion of certain termination provisions in every such con-
tract.8 2 However, this general rule is subject to an exception vis-A-
vis irrevocable inter vivos trusts created to pay the funeral and
burial expenses of the grantor.8 3 The 2003 Session's amendment
78. Act of Mar. 18, 2003, ch. 632, 2003 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-53(A) (Cum. Supp. 2003)).
79. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-53 (Cum. Supp. 2003).
80. Id. § 64.1-5.1(3)(b) (Repl. Vol. 2002 & Supp. 2003). The recent trial court decision
in Williams v. Harris, 59 Va. Cir. 369, 370, 372-73 (Cir. Ct. 2002) (Fairfax County), con-
tains an excellent discussion of this provision's operation.
81. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-16.3(B) (Repl. Vol. 2002). This Virginia Code section also
prohibits an abandoning spouse from taking "elective share, exempt property, family al-
lowance, and homestead allowance." Id. § 64.1-16.3(A) (Repl. Vol. 2002).
82. Id. § 54.1-2820(A)(7) (Repl. Vol. 2002).
83. Id.
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to this section "[cilarifies that preneed funeral contracts executed
through an irrevocable trust are not revocable and, therefore,
qualify as a resource exclusion under Medicaid or other federal or
state needs-based assistance programs." 4
N. Recordation-Powers of Attorney-Social Security Number
Virginia Code section 17.1-227, entitled "Documents to be re-
corded in deed books," was amended to provide that "[tihe clerk
may refuse to accept any instrument submitted for recordation
that includes a grantor's, grantee's or trustee's social security
number."85 This legislation will probably be interpreted by clerks
as applying to general powers of attorney, although it enumerates
only grantors, grantees, and trustees, and omits any reference to
"principals," because the section's opening sentence expressly re-
fers to "powers of attorney to convey real estate,"86 and every
well-drafted general power of attorney authorizes the conveyance
of real estate. And, although this legislation is cast in permissive
language (the clerk "may"),8 experience suggests that most clerks
will treat it as a mandatory requirement. The problem presented
by this legislation comes from the wide-spread use of durable
powers of attorney to avoid the default management provisions of
Virginia's conservatorship laws upon incapacity, 8 and the Inter-
nal Revenue Service's requirement that "[a] power of attorney
must contain the ... [ildentification number of the taxpayer (i.e.,
social security number and/or employer identification number)." 9
This conflict can easily be avoided in the future by having a client
execute two separate powers, identical in all respects except for
one (the one to be recorded) not containing the principal's social
security number. The real problem arises in the context of pres-
ently incapacitated principals who can no longer execute another
84. Drv. OF LEGIS. SERVS., VA. GEN. ASSEMBLY 2003 SESS. SUMMARY 154 (2003), avail-
able at http://dls.state.va.us/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2003). Act of Mar. 19, 2003, ch. 663,
2003 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2820(B) (Supp. 2003)).
85. Act of Mar. 22, 2003, ch. 862, 2003 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 17.1-227 (Repl. Vol. 2003)).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. A conservator is "a person appointed by the court who is responsible for managing
the estate and financial affairs of an incapacitated person." VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-134.6
(Cum. Supp. 2003).
89. 26 C.F.R. § 601.503(a) (2003).
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power, and persons presently capacitated who (or whose attor-
neys) do not learn of this option prior to their incapacity. Accord-
ingly, it is suggested that the 2004 Session amend this Virginia
Code section to authorize the clerk or the person offering a power
of attorney for recordation to temporarily cover the offending so-
cial security number, prior to the power's recordation, instead of
allowing the clerk to refuse to record the power.9 °
0. Commissioners of Accounts-Attorneys Only
Virginia Code section 26-8 has provided that if an attorney
cannot be found who is willing to serve as a commissioner of ac-
counts for a particular jurisdiction, "the court shall appoint some
other discreet and proper person."9' Similar language has ap-
peared in Virginia Code section 26-10, dealing with the appoint-
ment of assistant commissioners of accounts,92 and in Virginia
Code section 26-10.1, dealing with deputy commissioners of ac-
counts.93 The 2003 Session eliminated this language from each of
these sections.94 This legislation was recommended by the Judi-
cial Council, which was "not aware of any persons currently hold-
ing such positions who are not attorneys."9 5
P. Fiduciary Accounts-Canceled Checks as Vouchers
The general rule of Virginia Code section 26-17.9 requires a fi-
duciary, who is accounting before a commissioner of accounts, to
submit vouchers in support of all disbursements made during the
90. The Attorney General has opined that "[iun the absence of statutory authority, and
regardless of the motivation behind the removal of such information from a deed of trust, a
circuit court clerk who removes a social security number upon recordation of an instru-
ment does so at the risk of liability." Op. to Hon. J. Jack Kennedy, Jr. (Dec. 19, 2002),
available at http://www.oag.state.va.us/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2003).
91. VA. CODE ANN. § 26-8 (Repl. Vol. 2001).
92. Id. § 26-10 (Repl. Vol. 2001) ("IT]he court may appoint some other discreet and
proper person.").
93. Id. § 26-10.1 (Repl. Vol. 2001) ("Some other discreet and proper person may be so
appointed.").
94. Act of Mar. 16, 2003, ch. 194, 2003 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 26-8, -10, -10.1 (Cum. Supp. 2003)).
95. Div. OF LEG. SERVS., supra note 84, at 93, available at http://dls.state.va.us/ (last
visited Sept. 22, 2003).
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accounting period.96 The 1999 Session added a new subsection to
Virginia Code section 26-17.9 to allow fiduciaries to use a front-
and-back copy of a canceled check as a voucher, instead of having
to submit the original check to the commissioner, if the "copy was
made in the regular course of business in accordance with the
admissibility requirements of § 8.01-391."' The 2003 Session fur-
ther amended Virginia Code section 26-17.9 by providing, as an
alternative to front-and-back copies, for the submission of "a copy
of the front side of the check, and the periodic statement, from the
financial institution showing the check number and the amount
that coincides with the copy."9"
Q. Transfer of Decedent's Motor Vehicle-Sales Tax
Virginia Code section 58.1-2403, which provides for exemptions
from the Virginia Motor Vehicle Sales and Use Tax, was amended
by the 2003 Session to provide for the exemption of motor vehicles
"[t]itled in the name of a deceased person and transferred to the
spouse or heir [sic], or under the will, of such deceased person."
R. Private Trust Company Act
The 2003 Session added a new article to Title 6.1 to create the
structure for a private trust company that may serve as a trustee
and as an executor only for members of the family that created
96. VA. CODE ANN. § 26-17.9(A) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
97. Act of Mar. 10, 1999, ch. 74, 1999 Va. Acts 75 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 26-
17.9(E) (Repl. Vol. 2001)).
98. Act of Mar. 16, 2003, ch. 201, 2003 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 26-17.9(E)(ii) (Cum. Supp. 2003)). A further 2003 amendment to this subsection
provides that "the commissioner of accounts may require a fiduciary to exhibit the original
check or proper voucher for a specific payment or for distributions to beneficiaries or dis-
tributees." Id.
99. Act of Mar. 16, 2003, ch. 278, 2003 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 58.1-2403(27) (Cum. Supp. 2003)). This legislation further provides for its applica-
bility to "such transfers occurring on or after July 1, 2003." Id. It is believed that the
"transfer" referred to is the one from the decedent's personal representative to the dece-
dent's ultimate successor in interest, which would indicate this provision's applicability in
cases where the decedent died prior to the statute's effective date, but the personal repre-
sentative acted thereafter. Id. For additional discussion of the developments in Virginia
tax law over the past year, see Craig D. Bell, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Taxation, 38
U. RICH. L. REV. 267 (2003).
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it. °° Because of its costs, complexities, and limited application,
this concept will be seldom employed.
III. DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA
A. Marital Agreements-Contribution from Co-Obligor's Estate
The primary question in Caine v. Freier °' was the impact, if
any, upon the wife's ("W") rights in the husband's ("H") estate, of
a post-marital agreement that was executed only by W, but was
partially performed by H prior to his death. °2 The Supreme Court
of Virginia did not reach the issues relating to this agreement be-
cause the parties in interest failed to make appropriate assign-
ments of error to the trial court's rulings. °3 This case, which
originated as a suit brought by H's personal representative for aid
and guidance, also presented two issues involving settled ques-
tions of Virginia law and another turning on a factual determina-
tion. The first of these issues focused on the right of a person who
"'believes himself aggrieved'" by a final trial court decision to pre-
sent a petition for appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia.' °4 In
dismissing the personal representative as a party appellant, the
supreme court held that it was not "aggrieved" by the trial court's
decision because it "merely asked for the aid and guidance of the
lower court in administering the decedent's estate, and the decree
complained of gave it that relief."' The second issue dealt with
the liability of H's estate vis-a-vis the unpaid balance of $434,000
due on a purchase money indebtedness, for which H and W were
jointly and severally liable, and which was secured by a deed of
trust on tenancy by the entirety real estate that became the sole
100. Private Trust Company Act, ch. 910, 2003 Va. Acts __ (codified as amended at
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 6.1-32.30:1 to -32.30:7 (Cum. Supp. 2003)).
101. 264 Va. 251, 564 S.E.2d 122 (2002).
102. Id. at 254, 564 S.E.2d at 123-24.
103. Id. at 257, 564 S.E.2d at 125.
104. Id. at 257, 564 S.E.2d at 125 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-670(A) (Repl. Vol.
2002)).
105. Id. The Court noted that the trial court's rulings had no adverse affect on the "es-
tate" being administered by the personal representative, but only upon the beneficiaries of
the estate, and that "[tihe personal representative 'has no right, at the expense of the es-
tate, to seek [rulings] favorable to these legatees.'" Id. (quoting Shocket v. Silberman, 209
Va. 490, 492, 165 S.E.2d 414, 417 (1969)).
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property of W following H's death. °6 Referring to prior Virginia
authority that one of two jointly liable parties who pays more
than a proportionate share of their debt is entitled to contribu-
tion, the supreme court affirmed the trial court's ruling that -'s
estate was liable to W "for one-half of the indebtedness that is due
at the time contribution is sought."0 7 Lastly, the supreme court
did not reach the legal question regarding the enforceability of a
certain "general oral agreement regarding the decedent's estate
distribution plans" because "there [was] no credible testimony
that [H and W had a definite oral agreement for the distribution
of his estate."'
B. Legal Malpractice-Drafting Revocable Inter Vivos Trust
The issue in Rutter v. Jones,"°9 was "the ability of an executor
to bring an action for legal malpractice in connection with the
preparation of testamentary [sic] documents.""0 In this case, de-
cedent ("D") told her attorney ("A") that she "wanted each of her
two housekeepers to receive a 'remembrance amounting to about
$5,000 respectively""" and that she wished five percent of her re-
siduary estate to go to each of two charities. 1 2 However, the lan-
guage of the revocable trust, drafted by A, only "suggested" the
sum of $5,000 for the housekeepers' gifts and "ultimately left the
bequest amount to the trustee's discretion."" 3 The uncertainty of
the housekeepers' gifts made the percentage based residuary
106. Id. at 259, 565 S.E.2d at 126.
107. Id. at 260, 564 S.E.2d at 127 (citing Brown v. Hargraves, 198 Va. 748, 752, 96
S.E.2d 788, 792 (1957)).
108. Id. at 258, 564 S.E.2d at 126. The court did, however, call attention to Virginia
Code section 64.1-49 (Repl. Vol. 2002) (requiring wills to be in writing), and Virginia Code
sections 20-155, -149 (Repl. Vol. 2000) (requiring marital agreements to be in writing), and
made clear that it was not deciding that an oral plan would be enforced even if its exis-
tence was supported by credible evidence. See Caine, 264 Va. at 258, 564 S.E.2d at 126
(citing VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-155, -149 (Repl. Vol. 2000)). However, the Supreme Court of
Virginia has held that the language of Virginia Code section 20-155 requiring marital
agreements to be in writing does not prevent married persons from entering into a valid
oral contract to make a will. See Black v. Edwards, 248 Va. 90, 94, 445 S.E.2d 107, 110
(1994). For a more detailed discussion of Black, see J. Rodney Johnson, Annual Survey of
Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 1175, 1191-94 (1995).
109. 264 Va. 310, 568 S.E.2d 693 (2002).
110. Id. at 313, 568 S.E.2d at 694.
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charitable gifts uncertain, and thus they failed to qualify for the
federal estate tax charitable deduction,'14 which increased the es-
tate tax liability of D's estate by $663,996."' The executor's action
to recover this amount and the attorney fees D paid for the negli-
gent drafting was met by A's demurrer-which was sustained by
the trial court and affirmed by the Supreme Court of Virginia.'16
The supreme court noted that: (1) a fundamental requirement for
the survival of a cause of action is its existence during a dece-
dent's lifetime; 117 (2) no cause of action can arise until there is
damage;1 ' and (3) the damage claimed in this case did not arise
until after D's death.'19 Thus, as D had no action against A in her
lifetime, there was nothing to survive to her executor.120 Although
this decision appears to be correct under existing Virginia law, it
is the sort of "technical" decision that laypersons complain about
so often, that allows one who is guilty of a wrong to avoid any li-
ability therefor. And, in a case such as the present, where the
wrongdoer hiding behind the "technical" rules is an attorney, the
appearance of collusion and protectionism within the legal system
makes the problem that much worse. Moreover, this case does
not stand alone. It must be considered in the context of the Su-
preme Court of Virginia's earlier decision in Copenhaver v.
Rogers'2 1-the practical effect of which appears to be the immuni-
zation of the will drafting attorney from malpractice claims
brought by the client's beneficiaries, whether their claim is based
in tort or contract. 2 2 Although the narrow holding in Copenhaver
114. The federal provisions for charitable deductions for estate taxes can be found at 26
U.S.C. § 2055(a) (2000).
115. 264 Va. at 312, 568 S.E.2d at 694.
116. Id. at 312, 314, 568 S.E.2d at 694-95.
117. Id. at 313, 568 S.E.2d at 695.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 314, 568 S.E.2d at 695. The third element listed by the court, i.e., damage
did not arise until after D's death, would appear to have been met in this case because the
trust in question was revocable until D's death. Id. Thus the estate tax liability could
have been avoided and the malpractice cured by amending the trust any time prior to D's
death. By contrast, however, if an irrevocable trust had been involved, it would appear
than an injury would have occurred at the time of its execution (or the time it became ir-
revocable, if it was initially revocable), notwithstanding the fact that the exact amount of
damages suffered by virtue of this injury might not be known until a later time.
120. Id.
121. 238 Va. 361, 384 S.E.2d 593 (1989).
122. See generally Brian Adams, Note, Whose Beneficiaries Are They Anyway? Copen-
haver v. Rogers and the Attorney's Contract to Prepare a Will in Virginia, 24 U. RICH. L.
REV. 415 (1990) (discussing the ramifications of the Copenhaver decision).
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left the door open for beneficiaries to bring an action based upon a
third-party-beneficiary-contract theory,123 there are three signifi-
cant problems facing such litigants: (1) the court "assume(d)
without deciding," for the purpose of its decision in Copenhaver,
that Virginia's third-party-contract-beneficiary statute, which re-
fers to such claims based on a "covenant or promise,"'24 would
apply to an oral contact; 25 (2) the two completely unrealistic ex-
amples provided by the supreme court-to make an illogical dis-
tinction between an estate beneficiary and a contract benefici-
ary,12' and to illustrate a possible instance of third-party-
beneficiary-contract liability to a testator's beneficiaries127-are
both so unlikely to occur as to be non-existent; 2  and (3) the su-
preme court's statement that "under traditional rules, it will no
123. The supreme court found that "[tihe [beneficiaries] never alleged that [testators]
and [attorney] entered a contract of which they were intended beneficiaries. Thus, the mo-
tion for judgment utterly fails to allege a third-party beneficiary contract claim." 238 Va.
at 369, 384 S.E.2d at 597. Accordingly, the court's further comments regarding third-party
beneficiary contracts are dicta and have no binding effect on future cases.
124. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-22 (Repl. Vol. 1995) (allowing persons who are not parties to
take under an "instrument" and to sue on a "covenant or promise").
125. 238 Va. at 367, 384 S.E.2d at 595-96 (1989). The typical agreement between an
attorney and a client for drafting a will, or a revocable trust to serve as a will-substitute, is
not evidenced by a written contract.
126. Id. at 368, 384 S.E.2d at 596. It is submitted that everyone to whom a testator de-
vises or bequeaths is an intended, as opposed to an incidental, beneficiary of the testator
and of the testator's agreement with the will-drafting attorney.
127. Id. at 369, 384 S.E.2d at 597.
128. The court's opinion states in part as follows:
There is a critical difference between being the intended beneficiary of an es-
tate and being the intended beneficiary of a contract between a lawyer and
his client. A set of examples will illustrate the point: A client might direct his
lawyer to put his estate in order and advise his lawyer that he really does not
care what happens to his money except that he wants the government to get
as little of it as possible. Given those instructions, a lawyer might devise an
estate plan with various features, including inter vivos trusts to certain rela-
tives, specific bequests to friends, institutions, relatives and the like. In this
first example, many people and institutions might be beneficiaries of the es-
tate, but none could fairly be described as beneficiaries of the contract be-
tween the client and his attorney because the intent of that arrangement was
to avoid taxes as much as possible. By contrast, a client might direct his law-
yer to put his estate in order and advise his lawyer that his one overriding in-
tent is to ensure that each of his grandchildren receive one million dollars at
his death and that unless the lawyer agrees to take all steps necessary to en-
sure that each grandchild receives the specified amount, the client will take
his legal business elsewhere. In this second example, if the lawyer agrees to
comply with these specific directives, one might fairly argue that each grand-
child is an intended beneficiary of the contract between the client and the
lawyer.
Id. at 368-89, 384 S.E.2d at 596-97 (second emphasis added).
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doubt be difficult for a litigant, in a case of this kind, to meet the
requirements of third-party beneficiary claims."1 29 It is submitted
that this shameful state of the law cannot be defended and that it
is incumbent upon the General Assembly, with its attorney mem-
bers in the forefront, to rectify this unjust state of the law in the
2004 Session.
C. Revocable Trusts--Grantor / Trustee/Life Beneficiary's
Conveyance of Assets
In Austin v. City of Alexandria,13 ° grantor ("G") created a revo-
cable inter vivos trust in 1993 ("Trust 1"), of which he was trus-
tee and life beneficiary, and from which he was permitted to
withdraw property by a signed instrument "upon giving reason-
able notice in writing to the Trustee."13" ' On the same day, G con-
veyed certain real estate to Trust 1 by a deed, which provided in
part that "'[any revocation of [Trust 1] by the [G] shall not be ef-
fective as to the property herein conveyed unless he execute[s] a
deed, duly recorded, evidencing such revocation and reversion of
title.""32 G created another revocable inter vivos trust in August
1999 ("Trust 2"), of which he was also trustee and life beneficiary,
and to which he purported to deed the real estate previously con-
veyed to Trust 1.1 However, this deed made no mention of the
129. Id. at 371, 384 S.E.2d at 598. This statement follows the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia's discussion of a Pennsylvania case wherein the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, cit-
ing one of its prior opinions, stated that a will beneficiary would be able to maintain a
third party beneficiary action against a negligent drafter only if their "contract indicated
the intention of both parties to benefit the legatee ... [and] even if the naming of the legatee
in the will is taken as indicating the testator's intent to benefit the legatee, it cannot be
taken to indicate that the drafting attorney intended to confer any benefit.'" Id. at 370, 384
S.E.2d at 598 (alteration in original) (quoting Guy v. Liederbach, 459 A.2d 744, 751
(1983)). With due respect to the Supreme Courts of both Pennsylvania and Virginia, it is
submitted that the drafting attorney does not have to intend to make a gift to a client's
beneficiaries in order to have the requisite intent to "confer any benefit" upon them. The
benefit the attorney intends (or should be deemed to intend) to confer upon them, for a
consideration paid by the client, is a negligence-free will or trust that will enable them to
receive their intended gifts from the client.
130. 265 Va. 89, 574 S.E.2d 289 (2003).
131. Id. at 91-92, 574 S.E.2d at 290.
132. Id. at 92, 574 S.E.2d at 290-91.
133. Id. at 93, 574 S.E.2d at 291.
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1993 deed of the same property to' Trust 1, and the signature
thereon did not describe G as the trustee of Trust LY"'
In October 1999, G, acting as trustee of Trust 2, entered into a
contract for the sale of the real estate in question. 135 Following G's
death in March 2000, and prior to the date for performance of the
real estate sale contract, the successor trustee of Trust 1 sought a
declaratory judgment that the property in question remained a
part of Trust 1 and thus was not subject to the sales contract. 136
The trial court, applying a substance over form analysis, con-
cluded that the property was a part of Trust 2, and thus subject
to the sales contract, because G had withdrawn the property from
Trust 1 "by virtue of the documents creating [Trust 21 and the
deed to himself as trustee of [Trust 21." 1"7 However, the supreme
court reversed, holding that "the 1999 deed purporting to convey
the property to [Trust 21 was ineffective because [G] did not make
the conveyance as trustee of [Trust 1] and he had no legal title in
the property to convey in his individual capacity."38
D. Boiler-Plate Fiduciary Powers-Meaning of "Estate"
Virginia Code section 64.1-57 contains a collection of fiduciary
powers that may be conferred upon an executor or trustee by ref-
erence thereto in the governing will or trust,139 and Virginia Code
section 64.1-57.1 creates a procedure whereby a circuit court may
grant any or all of these powers to a personal representative or
trustee when the governing instrument fails to do so, and to an
administrator where there is no will. 4 ° One of these powers au-
thorizes a fiduciary to "sell ... any... property, either real, per-
sonal or mixed, which may be included in, or may at any time be-
come part of the trust or estate." In In re Estate of Trent,'42 the
testatrix's personal estate was insufficient to pay her debts and
her administrator c.t.a. petitioned the court, pursuant to Virginia
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 94, 574 S.E.2d at 291-92.
137. Id. at 94, 574 S.E.2d at 292.
138. Id. at 97, 574 S.E.2d at 293.
139. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-57 (Supp. 2003).
140. Id. § 64.1-57.1 (Repl. Vol. 2002 & Supp. 2003).
141. Id. § 64.1-57(1)(b) (Supp. 2003).
142. 58 Va. Cir. 83 (Cir. Ct. 2001) (Richmond City).
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Code section 64.1-57.1, "for a grant of the powers set out in Va.
Code § 64.1-57, particularly the power to sell the [testatrix's] real
estate."143 However, the court denied this request on the ground
that the power in question would only authorize the sale of realty
in testatrix's "estate" and "[in the absence of testamentary lan-
guage to the contrary, title to real property vests in the devisee or
heir immediately upon the death of the decedent."'" To the ar-
gument that the word "estate," as used in Virginia Code section
64.1-57(1)(b), did not have such a limited meaning, the court re-
sponded that there was no need for statutory construction be-
cause the provision in question was "clear and unambiguous
[and] ... [since the real property belonging to [testatrix] has
never become part of her estate, the court cannot grant petitioner
the power he seeks."145 No appeal was taken from this decision.
In a subsequent case before the same court, In re Estate of
Rountree,46 an intestate's personal estate was insufficient to pay
her debts and her administrator petitioned the court, pursuant to
Virginia Code section 64.1-57.1, for a grant of the powers set out
in Virginia Code section 64.1-57 in order to sell her real estate.
147
However, the court denied this request, "for the reasons stated
... in [Trent] ."148 In reversing the Rountree decision, the Supreme
Court of Virginia noted that the case upon which the trial court
relied in Trent149 "did not hold that a decedent's real property is
not part of the estate merely because title vests in the decedent's
heirs or devisees," 1 ° and that "[wiith regard to the definition of
the word 'estate', we have previously acknowledged 'the varied
meaning which attaches to this word under varying condi-
tions[..' 15 ' As the supreme court's decision in Rountree came in
the form of an unpublished order, the full text of this order is re-
143. Id. at 83. For a more detailed discussion of Virginia Code section 64.1-57, see su-
pra Part II.D.
144. In re Estate of Trent, 58 Va. Cir. at 84 (citing Broaddus v. Broaddus, 144 Va. 727,
741-42, 130 S.E. 794, 798-99 (1925)).
145. Id. at 86.
146. No. HQ-2426-4 (Va. Cir. Ct. Apr. 23, 2002) (Richmond City); see also supra note 37
and accompanying text.
147. Rountree, No. HQ-2426-4, at 1.
148. Id.
149. 58 Va. Cir. 83, 84 (Cir. Ct. 2001) (Richmond City) (relying upon Broaddus, 144 Va.
at 741-42, 130 S.E. at 798-99).
150. In re Bullock, No. 021740, slip op. at 3 (Va. Apr. 17, 2003).
151. Id. at 3-4 (quoting Neblett v. Smith, 142 Va. 840, 851, 128 S.E. 247, 250 (1925)).
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produced as an appendix to this article" 2 as a service to the bar
because it reverses the result and rationale of a published trial
court opinion (Trent), and it contains further definitional material
relating to "estate" that will be helpful to the bar beyond the nar-
row context of the Trent and Rountree cases. 53
IV. VIRGINIA CIRCUIT COURT: REVOCABLE INTER VIVoS TRUST-
REVOCATION BY CONSERVATOR
The issue in In re Rudwick154 was whether the conservator of
an incapacitated settlor could exercise the settlor's reserved
power of revocation to revoke her inter vivos trust.'55 The trial
court rendered a decision concluding that, unless negated by the
trust agreement, "the statutory powers conferred on [the conser-
vator] pursuant to Va. Code Ann. §§ 37.1-137.3, 37.1-137.4, and
64.1-57, affirmatively empower him to exercise [the settlor's]
power to revoke her trust, without prior court approval."'56 Be-
cause of the legal issues and practical problems raised by this de-
cision, the Virginia Bar Association and the Virginia Bankers As-
sociation requested and received permission to file amicus curiae
briefs in opposition thereto and to participate in a rehearing prior
to the entry of a final order based upon that decision. However,
the case was rendered moot by the settlor's death prior to the
scheduled rehearing which automatically terminated the settler's
trust and the conservator's powers. 5'7 As a result of this case, the
152. See infra Part VI.
153. The results in Trent and Rountree prompted an amendment to Virginia Code sec-
tion 64.1-57. The amendment specifies that "[flor the purposes of this section, the term
'estate' shall include all interests in the real or personal property of a decedent passing by
will or by intestacy." Act of Mar. 16, 2003, ch. 30, 2003 Va. Acts - (codified as amended
at VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-57(6) (Cum. Supp. 2003)). For additional discussion of this
amendment, see supra Part II.D.
154. No. 01-633, 2002 WL 31730757 (Va. Cir. Ct. Dec. 5, 2002) (Arlington County).
155. Id. at*1.
156. Id. at *6.
157. Due to the settlor's death, the trial court concluded that "this matter no longer
presents a justiciable controversy" and entered a final order dismissing the case. In re
Rudwick, No. 01-633 (Va. Cir. Ct. May 19, 2003) (final order dismissing case). For a copy
of the final order see infra Part VI. Ordinarily, this mootness would prevent the case from
being the subject of comment in this annual review. However, as the court's opinion was
the subject of a front-page story in Virginia Lawyers Weekly (Paul Fletcher, Conservator
Has Power to Revoke Trust for Ward, 17 VA. LAW WKLY. 709 (2002)); was published by one
of the national reporting systems, was digested in Virginia Lawyers Weekly, id. at 724;
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Virginia Bar Association successfully sought legislation in the
2003 Session providing that "[a] conservator may exercise the in-
capacitated person's power to revoke or amend a trust or to with-
draw or demand distribution of trust assets only with the ap-
proval of the court for good cause shown, unless the trust
instrument expressly provides otherwise."'5 8
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons recited herein, it is respectfully submitted that
the 2004 Session should: (1) enact legislation removing all barri-
ers presently preventing a decedent's beneficiaries and personal
representative from bringing a cause of action to recover damages
from the attorney whose negligent will or trust drafting has re-
sulted in economic loss or damage;'59 (2) enact legislation applica-
ble to an agent seeking to revoke a principal's inter vivos trust
that parallels the 2003 legislation applicable to a conservator;'
60
and (3) amend Virginia Code section 17.1-227 to provide for tem-
porarily covering a principal's social security number upon the
recordation of a power of attorney.' 6'
and was picked up by at least one professional newsletter; it is possible that many who
have heard of the opinion might not otherwise hear of its ultimate resolution and that
some might rely upon its analysis as a correct statement of Virginia law.
158. Act of Mar. 16, 2003, ch. 528, 2003 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 37.1-137.5(D) (Cum. Supp. 2003)); see also supra discussion Part II.E.
159. See supra Part III.B.
160. See supra Part II.E.
161. See supra Part II.N.
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VI. APPENDIX
A. In re Estate of Rountree
In the Circuit Counr of ike Cit of Ricbnond, Jobn Marhall C..oits Ekiling
IN RE. ThE ESTATE OF
•ROSZTTA S. ROUNTRE, Deccaued HQ-2426-4
This cause came on April 5, 2002, on the petition of
Willie E. Bullock, Administrator of the Estate of Rosetta
S. Rountree. deceased, to be granted the powers nst out in
Va. Code I 64.1-S7, particularly the power to sll the real
property located at 1432 Boroughbridge Road in Richmond,
and was argued by counsel.
Upon consideration whereof, and for the reasons stated
in the letter opinion dated November 27, 2001, in Case No.
Xg-1786-4, In Ret The Estate of Carolyn Carlotta Trent,
Deceased, it is --
ORDERRD that the petition is denied, petitionerfs,
objection being noted.
And nothing further remaining to be done herein, it i
ordered that this action is removed from the active docket
of the court and the papers placed among the ended causes.
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B. In re Rudwick
IN T1E CIRCUIT COURT OF ARLINGTON COUNTY
IN RE: REGINA E. RUDWICK ) CHANCERY NO. 01-633
ORDER
It being suggested by SunTrust Bank, as trustee under the Grantor Trust Agreement with
Regina Rudwick, and by George W. Dodge, as Substitute Conservator for Regina Rudwick, that
Regina Rudwick died on February 17, 2003, whereupon the trust and the authority of the
Substitute Conservator for Regina Rudwick were terminated, this matter no longer presents a
justiciable controversy.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the Court's ruling in its letter opinion to counsel, dated
December 5, 2002, and the reconsideration thereof be and hereby are withdrawn, and that this
matter be and hereby is dismissed.
Endorsement of this Order by counsel for the Section on Wills, Trusts, and Estates of the
Virginia Bar Association and the Virginia Bankers Association is dispensed with in accordance
with Rule 1:13 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia.
/ 9
ENER: -- 4-4-00
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